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ABSTRACT: 
 
Analysts play an essential role in the stock market as information intermediaries. Prior studies 
about analysts have primarily concentrated on analysts’ forecast accuracy and abnormal re-
turns. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether seasonal affective disorder (SAD), a 
psychological condition that increases risk aversion and pessimism during autumn and winter 
seasons, affects the recommendations on Finnish analysts. Thus, SAD studies concentrate pri-
marily on the changes in people’s behavior between seasons. 
 
Previous studies on analysts argue that while SAD should be taken into consideration, there is 
not a unanimous opinion on whether it has a crucial effect on analysts’ forecasts. This thesis 
provides further evidence that seasonal affective disorder (SAD) has a significant effect on Finn-
ish analysts’ recommendations. This is done by analyzing the recommendation distributions 
from 2010–2018. Furthermore, this thesis examines the returns and recommendations of 55 
companies from the Finnish stock market between 2010–2018. To test the statistical significance 
of Finnish analysts’ recommendations, a regression model is run where the announcement mar-
ket-adjusted return (ANNR) is tested against the firm and analyst specific controls. The SAD var-
iable is then included in the model to test its significance on announcement day returns. Also, 
three subsamples are constructed to test the impact of upgrades, downgrades, and resumptions 
to the ANNRs.  
 
Regression results provide evidence that SAD is a statistically significant factor. In nearly every 
model, the SAD variable is statistically significant. Another interesting finding is that Finnish an-
alysts tend to issue more downgrades during the SAD season than upgrades. This might be be-
cause SAD mitigates the optimistic bias, increasing Finnish analysts’ risk aversion and thus 
prompts them to issue more negative recommendations. Furthermore, the SAD impact was sta-
tistically more significant during winter than in fall. However, the response to downgrades is 
more negative during fall than in winter. This is in line with previous studies, that state that 
during fall the initial reaction to the seasonal change is stronger than in winter, when the amount 
of sunlight starts to increase (Kamstra et al., 2003). SAD’s impact to analysts’ forecasts is some-
thing that every investor should be aware of. Furthermore, it provides an intriguing subject to 
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Professional forecasts of financial analysts play a crucial role in the capital markets by 
providing information to the policymakers and private economic decision-makers. In this 
digitalized society, investors have an ample amount of information to process, while at 
the same time, they are expected to make quick rational decisions to profit from their 
investments. Therefore, the demand for active wealth management and analysts’ fore-
cast recommendations have increased. (Foster & Warren, 2015.) 
 
Equity analysts are entities in the stock market that issue buy, sell, or hold recommen-
dations. They play a crucial role as an information intermediary to both fund managers 
and investors alike. Buy-side analysts’ recommendations directly affect portfolio manag-
ers’1 investment decisions while sell-side analysts are essential in the price discovery 
process. For analysts to be relevant, their forecasts need to be superior to time series 
forecasts and yield better measures of market earnings expectations. This questions the 
efficient market hypothesis, where every investor has equal knowledge and information 
about the capital markets. Thus, abnormal returns should not be born from individual 
investment decisions in the long-term. (Bradley, Clarke, Lee & Ornthanalai, 2014.) 
 
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) is defined as a psychological condition that increases 
risk aversion and pessimism in the fall and winter period. The sudden change in sunlight 
between seasons is believed to be the cause of this condition. The SAD theory implies 
that a person who is under influence of SAD is more likely to get depressed or alienated 
from society. This SAD effect is said to be more significant in the northern part of the 
globe, where winters are typically longer. However, SAD may not be adequate to explain 
the psychological factors behind analysts’ recommendations sufficiently. Even the stock 
market experiences its own share of seasonal anomalies which affect the stock prices. 
Furthermore, the acts of terrorism and even major sports events are said to influence 
 
1 Brown, Call, Clement & Sharp (2016) studied the endeavors and determinants of buy-side analysts and 
their recommendations.  
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analysts’ recommendations. Nonetheless, SAD studies the individual’s reaction to the 
changes between seasons and thus can provide an exceptional tool to determine ana-
lysts’ behavior. (Kamstra, Kramer & Levi, 2003.) 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether SAD has an impact on Finnish analysts’ 
recommendations. This is done by examining how the recommendations behavior be-
tween Finnish analysts changes within a calendar year in Finland. The data contains rec-
ommendations and stock prices from Finnish companies listed in the Finnish stock ex-
change OMXH. The recommendations come in five different categories: strong buy, buy, 
hold, sell, and strong sell.  
 
This thesis intends to find an answer to whether or not SAD has a crucial impact on fi-
nancial analysts’ stock recommendations. Kamstra et al. (2003) find that as the amount 
of daylight decreases, investors’ propensity to trade will decrease accordingly. This might 
encourage analysts to issue more negative recommendations during SAD seasons and 
positive recommendations during non-SAD seasons when the trading frequency is ex-
pected to be higher due to investors’ lower risk aversion (Kamstra et al., 2003). This is 
done by constructing a regression model where the company’s announcement day mar-
ket-adjusted return (ANNR) is the dependent variable. The main hypothesis is to find out 
whether SAD affects surveyed companies ANNRs. Furthermore, one of the prime inter-
ests of this thesis is to find out whether Finnish analysts are afflicted with the pessimistic 
bias associated with SAD. This is investigated in the second hypothesis, which examines 
whether the downgrades issued during SAD months affect negatively to the surveyed 
companies ANNRs. Also, as Kamstra et al. (2003) state, the SAD is more prominent during 
fall, and this assumption is investigated in the third hypothesis, which intends to find out 
whether downgrades issued in fall affect more negatively to the ANNRs than those is-




The effect that SAD has on analysts' recommendations is a subject that has yet to be 
thoroughly studied. Most studies, such as from Kamstra et al. (2003) and Dolvin, Pyles 
and Wu (2009) focus on estimating the SAD’s impact on analysts’ forecasts and forecast 
revisions. However, the main contribution of this study is to examine how Finnish ana-
lysts’ behavior in issuing recommendations change during the year. The main argument 
among the SAD studies states that during darker seasons, people tend to avoid excessive 
risk-taking (Kamstra et al., 2003). This approach is extended to analysts by examining the 
distribution of their recommendations. The purpose is to find out whether the changes 
between seasons and in the analysts’ moods play a significant role in the Finnish equity 
market. This is done by scrutinizing stock recommendations issued by analysts based in 
Finland from 2010 to the end of 2018. This thesis contributes to the literature by being 
one of the first studies to scrutinize and provide information on: (i) the development of 
Finnish analysts’ stock recommendations during the post-financial crisis era, (ii) the value 
of the surveilled distributions for predicting the profitability of future recommendations 
and lastly, (iii) the impact of SAD to the profitability of these recommendations and its 
predictive value. This is accomplished by constructing three subsamples depending on 
the recommendation typing and testing their impact on the surveyed companies’ mar-
ket-adjusted returns on the recommendation announcement days.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
First, this study provides a theoretical background that helps to comprehend what fac-
tors affect analysts’ recommendations. Thus, the efficient market theory is presented 
very early on in the thesis. To sufficiently understand the impact that analysts have in 
the capital market, one must comprehend how analysts analyze market information. 
 
The second part of the opening chapter presents the different stock valuation models. It 
is mandatory for both analysts and for investors to understand how stock are evaluated 
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and what factors might affect their pricing. While these valuation models provide an ex-
ceptional tool for analysts to exploit, it is important essential to remember to evaluate 
critically what these models try to indicate.   
 
After the literature review, the study moves on to the analysts. The third chapter pre-
sents analysts and explains how they measure market information. It also explains what 
factors affect analysts’ recommendations. This is done by reviewing the background of 
the analysts. Furthermore, the chapter investigates the behavioral aspects of analysts 
and their effect on individual analysts’ recommendations. 
 
The fourth chapter introduces the SAD theory and seasonal anomalies that affect ana-
lysts. First, stock market anomalies are presented, which is followed by examining the 
SAD’s impact on analysts’ recommendations. The fifth chapter presents the data and 
methodologies used to model the empirical research conducted in this thesis. The sixth 
chapter presents the results from the empirical research. Afterwards, the study moves 
on to the last chapter of the thesis where the study concludes the main arguments that 




Due to the available data, this thesis must make some exceptions. First, instead of using 
daily data, the monthly data is employed. This is due to the nature of the data. Interna-
tional Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database presents the recommendation data 
as the end of the month values. As such, returns and recommendations are calculated 
using monthly intervals instead of daily intervals. Furthermore, the recommendation 
data is generic, which in a sense is not an issue. This means that the data contains the 
total amount of recommendations a company has received at time t. This, however, does 
not separate the origins of the recommendations i.e. which analyst issued the recom-
mendation. As both the SAD and stock return data are adjusted to monthly intervals this 
might prompt reliability issues, since SAD has a different value depending on the day of 
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the year and naturally so does stock prices. To mitigate this, a corresponding SAD value 










2 Capital markets and security pricing  
To fully understand how analysts’ recommendations affect stock prices one has to com-
prehend how the capital market works. Proper knowledge of the theory can help the 
market participants to execute investment decisions in practice. Thus, the reader needs 
to have a better comprehension of the theory behind every recommendation. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework of the efficient market the-
ory and the valuation models that are used to evaluate stocks.  
 
2.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
The efficient markets hypothesis (later EMH) has been the core premise of finance for 
nearly five decades. Eugene Fama (1970), who is held as one of the pioneers of EMH 
theory, defines an efficient market as one in which security prices always sufficiently re-
flect the available information. Thus, according to EMH, stock markets such as NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki or S&P 500 are efficient. Furthermore, Fama (1970) remarks that no inves-
tor should be able to achieve excess returns of equilibrium based exclusively on infor-
mation. This suggests that investor - whether a regular individual or institutional - cannot 
beat the market regularly. Instead, EMH suggests that investors should hold the market 
portfolio and subside active capital management altogether. (Shleifer, 2000: 1-5.)  
 
EMH strongly believes that since the capital market is transparent and available to eve-
ryone, investors can and will receive every piece of information they need. Business cycle 
theorists have an unyielding belief that tracking the progress of several economic com-
ponents over time will help interpret the evolution of the economy. Bodie, Kane & Mar-
cus (2005: 370-378) state that any information that could affect or be used to predict 
stock performance should, in theory, be reflected in stock prices. However, Maurice Ken-
dall (1953) states that there are no predictable patterns in stock prices - it seemed that 
they evolve indiscriminately. Furthermore, a forecast for a positive future performance 
leads to even more positive current performance, as market participants try to get their 
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hands on the asset before the price hike. It is as if the stock prices moved in a random 
walk. (Bodie et al., 2005: 369-405.) 
 
Fama (1995) describes random walk as a phenomenon where price changes in individual 
securities are independent. This suggests that a series of stock price changes have no 
clear memory. The prior history of given security cannot be used to predict the future in 
any considerable way. 
 
Brealey, Myers & Allen (2006: 337-341) describes three forms of market efficiency. (i) the 
first level where, contemporary prices reflect the information contained in the history of 
past prices. This is defined as the weak form of market efficiency. (ii) the second level of 
efficiency or the so called semi-strong form of market efficiency requires that prices not 
only contains past information, but instead all other published information. (iii) Lastly, 
Brealey et al. (2006) define the third level of efficiency, the strong form of market effi-
ciency as a form where security prices must reflect all the information that can be ac-
quired from the market.  
 
Figure 1. illustrates stock price reaction to new information in both efficient and in-effi-
cient markets. In this particular case, a good news’ impact is investigated to the stock 
price. The green line represents efficient markets and the blue line in-efficient markets 
response to this information. Let say that analysts predict that soon the stock price will 
rise from its present value. According to EMH, this will have an immediate impact on the 
price of this given stock, hence the upward motion of the green line. However, if the 
price adjustment to information is slow, like in the blue line, this is typically defined as 
in-efficient markets. Overreaction to this information is mainly caused by the irrational 
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behavior of the investors. Over time the overreaction will even out to the stock price. 




Shleifer (2000: 2-28) argues that the primary theoretical case for the EMH culminates in 
three arguments. The first one being that investors are assumed to be rational and value 
assets rationally. Secondly, if some investors are not rational, their trades are random 
and thus cancel each other out without affecting prices. And lastly, if investors are irra-
tional in similar ways, they are met in the market by rational arbitrageurs who will elim-
inate their influence on prices.  
 
Arbitrageurs are participants on the market who make use of arbitrage. Arbitrage, as 
defined by Bodie et al. (2005: 343-344) is “the exploitation of security mispricing in such 
a way that risk-free profits can be earned.” Furthermore, to profit from this disparity in 
prices the transaction involves simultaneous purchase and sale of similar assets. 
 
Figure 1. New information’s impact on the stock price on efficient and inefficient markets 
(Haugen, 1997: 650.) 
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2.2 Behavioral finance and heuristic biases 
Psychologists have discovered two significant facts about the financial markets. Firstly, 
fear and greed are not the primary emotions that define risk-taking behavior but instead 
fear and hope as psychologist Lola Lopes noted in 1987 (Lopes 1987). Secondly, all types 
of financial practitioners make the same mistakes repeatedly. To better comprehend the 
psychological aspects of stock markets and investor behavior, economic researchers have 
created an application to study these concepts further. This application is known as be-
havioral finance. Shefrin (2002: 3-12) states that if financial advisers recognize their own 
and others’ mistakes, then they will be more effective at providing help to other investors 
because they have a better grasp of investor psychology. One investor’s downfall can 
mean others fortune. The main argument that Shefrin (2002) tries to make is that any 
financial practitioner is prone to commit psychological errors. Sufficient knowledge of 
behavioral finance can help investors recognize the mistakes of others as well as their 
own.  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, for the EMH to hold, certain conditions regarding in-
formation and investor behavior must be met. However, Shiller’s (1981) study on stock 
market volatility proves that stock prices are far more volatile than could be justified. 
Shiller estimated the net present values of stocks using a constant discount rate with 
some specific assumptions about the stock’s dividend processes. Shiller’s findings have 
helped to point out the way to an entirely new area of research. The purpose of this 




Arguably one of the most defining principles affecting financial decisions is known as 
representativeness. Shefrin (2002: 14-18) defines that representativeness refers to judg-
ments based on and reliance on stereotypes.   
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Shleifer (2000: 127-129) states that a crucial example of the representative heuristic is 
when people think that they can see patterns in entirely sporadic sequences. This form 
of the representativeness heuristic is suggestive of the overreaction phenomenon de-
scribed in figure 2. Analysts under the representativeness heuristic might disregard the 
fact that a history of excessively high earnings growth is unlikely to repeat itself, thus 
overvalue the company, and become disappointed in the future when the forecasted 
earnings growth fails to come to fruition. 
 
The winner-loser effect documented in figure 2 can be used to illustrate the representa-
tiveness bias. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) compared two separate portfolios: extreme 
losers and winners. They found out that stocks that have been extreme past losers in the 
preceding three years fared much better than extreme past winners over the following 
three years. One explanation for this phenomenon, like De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
stated, was that stock prices have a tendency to overreact – extreme losers become too 
undervalued whereas the extreme winners become too expensive and thus yield lower 








Psychological studies of forecast behavior point out that predictions by individual market 
participants are prone to systematic biases, which may induce predictable and significant 
forecast errors. One extensively documented form of these systematic biases is anchor-
ing. Campbell and Sharpe (2009) define anchoring as a bias where investors choose fore-
casts that are too close i.e. anchored, to some readily observable prior or arbitrary point 
of departure. This kind of behavior yields in estimations that underweight new infor-
mation. Furthermore, anchoring bias can increase predictable forecast errors. 
 
Sherfin (2002) states that depending on the information available for analysts play a cru-
cial role in their forecasts. Some might have a hard time to assimilate new information 
to their forecast and make proper adjustments while other fail to notice prior infor-
mation after receiving new. Sherfin (2002) further explains that most people – analysts 
included - tend to react too conservatively to new information. He believes this is 
Figure 2. Cumulative average returns for winner and loser portfolios (De Bondt & Thaler, 
1985.) 
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For self-preservation, people have adopted a social behavior that prompts us to interact 
in a crowd. That is something that is hardwired to the primitive part of our brains. Re-
searchers Jane Cote and Debra Sanders (1997) defined herding as a behavior that occurs 
when individuals use consensus opinion to adjust their own beliefs. However, this kind 
of behavior can be hazardous in financial situations. If investors want to maximize the 
profit from their investments, they should be the first one to act. If they decide to “go 
with the flow”, they are too late. However, there is overabundance of information acces-
sible to investors. Some investors may not have enough resources to analyze all the re-
quired information. Instead, they place their trust in entities who are specialized at scru-
tinizing information, like financial analysts for example. (Durand, Limkriangkrai & Fung, 
2014.) 
 
Herding behavior is something that we humans have developed throughout our history 
of evolution. It has been one of the key factors that enabled us to become what we are 
today. However, in financial decisions herding bias can cause more harm than good. At 
worst, herding bias can exaggerate the total impact that information can cause to the 
stock prices. (Durand, Limkriangkrai & Fung, 2014.) 
 
 
2.3 Valuation models 
Previous chapters have focused on the efficient market hypothesis. However, in volatile 
markets such as the stock markets, there can be scenarios where an incident cannot be 
reconciled with the EMH. Bodie et al. (2005: 281-302) define these as the efficient mar-
ket anomalies. The main difficulty lies in the portfolio risk, which needs to be adjusted 
19 
to evaluate the success of an investment strategy. One answer to this dilemma is the 
capital asset pricing model (later CAPM).  
 
 
2.3.1 Capital asset pricing model 
CAPM is arguably one of the most well-known models for asset pricing. It was cultivated 
from the research by William Sharpe, John Litner, and Jan Mossin. CAPM is a tool to 
measure risk. The premise behind the model is that risk and return should go hand in 
hand – the more risk investor decides to bear, the higher the expected return should also 
be. Furthermore, the model determines market risk as a systematic risk, which is the 
only risk that affects the securities expected return. The stock-specific risk is measured 
by beta which varies depending on how volatile the company i.e. the stock itself is.   
(Sharpe 1964; Litner 1965; Mossin, 1966.) 
 
One of the main appeals of the CAPM is that it aims to make every investor equal. For 
this to happen, the model makes several assumptions about the investor behavior and 
even the market itself. The list can vary depending on the literature, but according to 
Bodie et al. (2005: 282-284) the main assumptions are: 
1. There are plenty of investors on the market, and their wealth is small compared 
to the market capitalization. 
2. Every investor has the same holding period. 
3. Investments are limited to publicly traded financial assets.  
4. There are no taxes and transaction costs.  
5. All investors are rational market participants. 
6. Everyone investigates securities in the same way and share the same economic 
view.  
According to CAPM, beta variable measures the degree to which returns on the security 
and the market move in unison. In other words, the risk premium on individual securities 
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are relative to the risk premium on the market portfolio, and the beta coefficient of the 
asset is proportional to the market portfolio. Bodie et al. (2005: 283-284) define beta as 
                      
(1)                                          𝛽𝑖 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑀)
𝜎𝑀
2                   
 
Where: 
𝛽𝑖   is the beta of an individual security. 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑀)  is the covariance between stock i and market portfolio M. 
𝜎𝑀
2    is the variance of market portfolio M. 
 
Nikkinen et al. (2002: 68-75) point out that beta estimates the systematic risk of the 
individual security. Even with diversification, investors cannot fathom to eliminate the 
systematic risk. However, when investors have diversified their portfolio, they have mit-
igated their stock-specific risk. In other words, the systematic market risk is the only risk 
that they hold in their diversified portfolio. The expected return on stock exceeds the 
return of risk-free asset by the risk premium. The risk premium is defined as the product 
of stock-specific beta multiplied by market risk premium: 
 
(2)                                           𝐸(𝑟𝑖) =  𝑟𝑓  +  𝛽𝑖 [𝐸(𝑟𝑀) −  𝑟𝑓] 
 
Where: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖)   is the expected return of the stock. 
𝑟𝑓                                is the expected return on the risk-free asset 
𝛽𝑖   is the beta for stock i. 
𝐸(𝑟𝑀)   is the expected return of the market. 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) − 𝑟𝑓  is the risk premium. 




2.3.2 Stock returns 
CAPM is one of many models that offers to estimate the expected return of the stock. 
Bodie et al. (2005: 318-326) state that macroeconomic forces or anomalies that impacts 
the entire stock market should also be taken into consideration when evaluating the ex-
pected returns of the stock. These events are unexpected and can have either positive 
or negative influence on the stock prices. However, firm-specific factors should also be 
evaluated. Bodie et al. (2005) describe that these firm-specific events could be for in-
stance new inventions of the death of key employee. Equation 3. further demonstrates 
this effect: 
 
(3)                                           𝑟𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) + 𝑚𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖  
 
Where: 
𝑟𝑖  is the expected return on stock i. 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖)              is the expected return on the asset at the beginning of the holding period. 
𝑚𝑖  measures the impact of an unanticipated macroeconomic event. 
𝑒𝑖  is the impact of an unanticipated corporate specific event. 
 
It is important to realize, that both 𝑚𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖 represents the impact of unanticipated 
events. Thus, their expected values by definition should be zero on average. Bodie et al. 
(2005: 319-320) also mention that we should recognize the fact that different companies 




(4)                                           𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀 + 𝑒𝑖 
 
Where: 
𝑅𝑖  is the excess returns of stock i. 
𝛼𝑖  is the stock’s expected return if the market stays neutral. 
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𝛽𝑖  is the stock specific beta. 
𝑅𝑀  is the excess returns of risk-free asset M. 
𝑒𝑖  is the measurement of unexpected events to stock i. 
 
The index model defines two sources of risk that security i might possess. Market or 
systematic risk 𝑅𝑀 , which is the assets vulnerability to macroeconomic events that af-
fect the stock market as a whole. And secondly, the stock specific risk 𝑒𝑖, which is the 
factor that measures the unexpected events that are relevant to the security. (Bodie et 
al., 2005: 319-321.) 
 
For analysts and investors to estimate the risk in their portfolio, it is fundamental for 
them to understand the concept of standard deviation and variance. Variance can be 
described  as volatility while risk can be defined as the deviation from the expected re-
turn. Standard deviation σ measures the deviation from the expected return thus 
demonstrating the risk that the investor has to bear. Standard deviation is also the square 
root of the variance. Since 𝑒𝑖 is asset specific, the correlation between the components 
𝑅𝑀 and 𝑒𝑖 is zero. Thus, according to Bodie et al. (2005) the variance of the rate of return 
on asset i is the sum of the common and firm specific variances. This can be calculated 
from the formula (5): (Bodie et al., 2005: 320-322; Nikkinen et al., 31-35.) 
 
(5)                                          𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑀




2            is the variance of the security i 
𝛽𝑖
2𝜎𝑀
2  is the product of stock specific beta and market portfolios var-
iance. 
𝜎2(𝑒𝑖) is the product of variance and unexpected events of stock i. 
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3 Analysing the analysts 
In this society, filled with information, it can be quite demanding to keep up with every 
bit of information that one can obtain from their environment. The same dilemma ap-
plies to the stock market. As markets grow, investors are expected to know more external 
factors that could affect their portfolios. Furthermore, information can be quite expen-
sive to process. This is one of the main reasons why analysts and brokerage firms have 
gained popularity – these entities are responsible for a significant share of the initial 
studies carried out about the stock market. They assess the market information and then 
issue either forecasts or recommendations. Their findings are then enforced by essen-
tially all active fund managers. Thus, it is not surprising that most funds and investors 
rely almost entirely on such exogenous information. The purpose of this chapter is to 
describe who the analysts are, illustrate their prediction models and exhibit how their 
forecasts may affect stock equity. (Dimson & Marsh, 1984.) 
 
 
3.1 Characteristics of analysts and their recommendations 
Analysts are generally divided into two groups: buy-side and sell-side analysts. Both an-
alyst groups play a crucial role in the capital market as intermediaries to provide infor-
mation. The information that the analysts provide about financial markets can be 
used/sold in two way, directly or indirectly. Sell-side analysts sell their information di-
rectly while buy-side analysts indirectly. The individual impact of buy-side analysts and 
sell-side analysts depends on the type of analysis these entities produce. Public invest-
ment signals are more reflected to the stock prices than the private investment signals. 
However, investor’s reaction to private investment signals are exceptionally stronger 
compared to the public signals2. Since the private investment signal is less disclosed in 
 
2 According to Frey & Herbst (2014), for the public investment signal to have any investment value, the 
signal needs to be imperfectly observable.  
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the stock prices, investor’s response to these signals should be stronger. (Frey & Herbst, 
2014.)  
 
Buy-side analysts’ recommendations impact directly on the investment decisions of port-
folio managers. These analysts typically work for an investment bank or firm and carry 
out their research exclusively for the company that employs them. Compared to the sell-
side analysts, buy-side analysts’ reliance on financial statement is in much more pivotal 
role. Interestingly, buy-side analysts receive compensation from their forecasts and rec-
ommendations. Naturally, this might raise a question about the ethicality behind their 
recommendations. This is due to the financial incentive they can receive from the com-
pany that these buy-side analysts are employed to. (Brown, Call, Clement & Sharp, 2016.) 
 
Stefan Frey and Patrick Herbst (2014) investigate the trading behavior of fund managers. 
Their results support the belief that buy-side analysts’ have a remarkable effect on the 
trading behavior of fund managers. They also prove that buy-side analysts’ recommen-
dation upgrades yield positive abnormal returns while downgrades negative abnormal 
returns. As a result, fund managers respond more firmly to the changes in buy-side ana-
lysts’ recommendations. However, Frey and Herbst remind that because of the private 
nature of buy-side recommendations, the stock prices might not mirror all of the infor-
mation. Thus, they believe that it is more profitable for the investors to react to the pri-
vate information.  
 
One of the primary purposes of sell-side analysts is to endorse securities to investors. It 
is extremely argued assumption that funds and fund managers rely extensively on buy-
side recommendations compared to the sell-side recommendations. Although, sell-side 
analysts’ analysis concentrates more on small stocks or significant forecast errors and 
dispersions, compared to buy-side analysis which is more focused on big corporations. 
However, studies have showed that sell-side analysts can offer profitable 
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recommendations, and thus sell-side analysts’ portfolios can perform profitably3. Fur-
thermore, researchers Hobbs and Singh (2015) point out that the buy-side analysts fol-
low sell-side analysts’ recommendations. Why is it then that fund managers tend to favor 
buy-side recommendations? One possible answer is that the sell recommendations can 
more likely affect negatively to the stock prices and the image of the company. Thus, the 
stock recommendations from sell-side analysts can be questionable to include. (Hobbs 
& Singh, 2015.) 
 
Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) find that sell-side analysts follow companies in specific 
industries and generate information, such as stock recommendations and earnings fore-
casts to their clients. Furthermore, Hong et al. (2000) reiterate that sell-side analysts’ 
clients consist mostly of buy-side analysts  and institutional investors. Their primary way 
to accrue income comes from compensation. These can include fees from the trading 
volume the sell-side analysts generate to their clients or from the investment banking 
business that they offer to their client corporations. 
 
 
3.2 Forecasting process 
Foster (1986: 262-264) classifies four forecasting models used by financial analysts. The 
Mechanical approach requires that the data inputs are combined in a predetermined 
way such that the same estimate will always be made. In a non-mechanical approach, 
the investigated data and the forecast has no clear connection. For instance, an emo-
tional or a judgmental factor may be incorporated into the analyst’s recommendation. A 
univariate approach is described as an approach where analyst analyzes only a single 
variable, and in the multivariate approach, the analyst investigates with multiple varia-
bles. However, Foster points out that these approaches can go hand in hand. For instance, 
there can be a combination of mechanical and multivariate approaches. In fact, an 
 
3 Hobbs & Singh (2015) studied the discrepancies between buy-side and sell-side analysts. Their finding 
suggests that from 1994 to 2009, sell-side analysts’ portfolios performed profitably on average. For further 
literature, see Hobbs, Jeffrey & Singh, Vivek (2015). A Comparison of Buy-Side and Sell-Side Analysts. 
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example of this is a regression model that estimates the earnings of a company by fore-
casts of at least two independent variables.  
 
Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) define the factors that affect analyst’s forecasts and 
the impact of analysts’ forecasts. This is illustrated in figure 3. As analysts scrutinize in-
formation from numerous sources, such as from firm’s financial statements or industry 
forecasts, their competence will increase. They make use of information from these 
sources to produce recommendations and investors make their investment decisions 
from the reports that analysts generate. If the stock market works efficiently, this infor-
mation is directly reflected in the stock prices. However, Ramnath et al. (2008) state that 
the inefficiency that occurs in the capital market and between analysts can create pre-
dictable forecast errors and security price changes. Also, the external factors such as reg-
ulations and the available data processing tools affect how analysts form their forecasts. 
Regulations set a standard at how analysts should issue their forecasts. Furthermore, 
regulations can differ significantly between countries. Also, the tools that an analyst has 
access to limits the possibilities that the analyst can scrutinize the available information. 








3.3 Analysts’ behavioral biases 
Institutional factors and regulations play a pivotal role on how analysts produce their 
recommendations (Ramnath et al. 2008). Analysts are human like every one of us, and 
they too are prone to subdue to the behavioral biases. However, unlike us, they are ex-
pected to issue rational and accurate recommendations. Hong et al. (2000) review in 
their research about analysts’ career concerns. They find that herding among analysts 
could be intentional. This is thought to derive from the career pressure analysts face. 
Hong et al. (2000) reiterate that young analysts have a danger to get fired for issuing 
Figure 3. Analysts' forecast process (Ramnath, Rock & Shane, 2008.) 
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divergent forecasts from the consensus. Instead, it might be better for them to comply 
with the consensus opinion.  
 
Ivo Welch (2000) states that during a positive economic period, analysts collective herd-
ing towards consensus is especially stronger than in a downward trend. He warns that 
there also possess the danger. Upswings in the economy can warp the perceived infor-
mation, making them more “fragile”. In other words, the consensus has a significant in-
fluence on individual analysts forecast recommendations when economic expectations 
are positive. Thus, for example new information from the news have much more sub-
stantial impact during bull than in bear market.   
 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) argue that analysts are systematically optimistic to the new 
information. Analysts tend to underestimate bad news while overreact to positive earn-
ings news. This systematic behavior is also called as optimism bias. Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999) point out two reasons for analyst’s optimistic bias. Firstly, analyst have financial 
incentives to offer the stocks of their brokerage firms. Secondly, analysts need to get 
close with corporate executives. For this to happen, analysts might have to issue positive 
forecasts for the company.  
 
Andrew Jackson (2005) studied career laddering and analyst reputation. Jackson found 
a negative correlation between analysts’ short-term financial incentives and building a 
reputation by providing honest forecasts. He conducted his investigation by investigating 
analyst optimism. According to Jackson (2005), the more trading volume an analyst can 
bring to the company, the more optimistic the analyst’s behavior is. However, Jackson 
notes that analysts do have the incentive to accumulate commissions for the cost of their 
reputation. Since analysts’ commissions are based on how much their recommendations 
can generate trade, it creates the financial incentives to adjust their behavior towards 
exciting the company. Jackson (2005) believes this is clearly linked to analysts’ optimism 
bias. However, Jackson does remind that if analysts’ issue dubious recommendations 
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their reputation will falter. Thus, analysts who care for their careers should avoid submit-
ting to their urges.    
 
Furthermore, Jackson (2005) states that investors are more likely to follow the recom-
mendations issued by well-known analysts. Jackson (2005) finds that forecasts made by 
All-American analysts, who are among the best ranked analysts in the U.S., issue, on av-
erage, the most accurate forecasts. Jackson continues that his research proves that All-
American analysts could accumulate more excess returns to their respective brokerage 
firms. The interesting finding here is that the more renowned the analyst is, the more 
financial utility that analyst can gain. Jackson's (2005) outcome implies that in the long 
run it might be more profitable for the analysts to be honest and accurate rather than 
pursuing short-term benefits.  
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) investigated analyst behavior and the corporate disclosure. 
They find that firms that disclose their company-related information are more likely to 
be followed by analysts. Furthermore, they state that as firms publish more of their com-
pany-related information, the more analysts they will attract. When the disclosure of 
company-specific information is extensive, the discrepancies between analysts’ recom-
mendations are caused by the differences in non-company-specific information.  
 
 
3.4 Analyst forecast accuracy  
It might not be a simple task to form a cohesive investment decision and make a profit 
out of it. One concern may arise from the fact that there is so much information available 
about the capital markets. However, market participants can utilize different forecasts, 
such as univariate time series forecasts or recommendations made by analysts. Univari-
ate time series forecasts assist in measuring the earnings expectations by the best avail-
able forecasts. Besides past earnings, these univariate time series forecasts disregard any 
other possible time series. Thus, they do not produce the most accurate forecasts. When 
comparing univariate time series forecasts to analysts’ forecasts, analysts’ forecasts 
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employ more data, and thus they should be superior to them. Furthermore, analysts’ 
forecasts measure more effectively market earnings expectations than time series mod-
els. (Brown & Rozeff, 1978.) 
 
Hilary and Hsu (2013) review the analysts forecast consistency and find that analysts who 
consistently make forecast errors affect greatly to the stock prices. They state three rea-
sons for this. First, analysts who consistently issue accurate recommendations are less 
likely to get fired and thus are more probable to be promoted to top tier analysts. Sec-
ondly, to increase their consistency, analysts purposely issue biased forecasts. Lastly, the 
institutional investors’ presence affects how analysts produce their forecasts. 
 
Stickel (1992) reiterates that on average, All-American analysts can produce more accu-
rate recommendations than any other analysts. Furthermore, most recommendations 
from the market are most probably issued by All-American analysts. Stickel’s findings 
suggest that recommendations issued by All-American analysts’ affect stock prices more 
than recommendations issued by other analysts as well. Their forecasts differ signifi-
cantly from the consensus making them less predictable too. Stickel’s study further sup-
port the assumption that All-American analysts are the most effective analysts in the 













4 The impact of seasonal factors on analysts 
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) and the stock market anomalies and their impact on 
security analysts are in the focal point in this chapter. It also presents the current litera-
ture of SAD’s impact on analysts’ recommendations.  
 
 
4.1 Seasonal affective disorder and the capital markets 
“And God said, Let there be light; and there was light. And God saw that the light was good.” (Gen-
esis 1:3.) 
 
Above phrase from the Bible is something that most Scandinavians can agree to - at least 
after the winter. One way to examine the effect of deprivation of light in people is 
through SAD. Kamstra et al. (2003) define SAD as a psychological condition that height-
ens depression and pessimism during fall and winter periods. The sudden change and 
the lack of sunlight is believed to be the root cause of this phenomenon. Besides the 
sudden increase in depression and risk aversion, other known SAD symptoms include 
increase in difficulties while concentrating, sleep debt, decrease in sexual activity and 
possibly alienation from society. Kamstra et al. (2003) state in their study that there is an 
unmistakable connection between risk aversion and depression. When the days get 
shorter, the depression in people tends to rise. Furthermore, as humans get more de-
pressed their susceptibility to anxiety and other negative emotions starts to increase. 
This can reduce their willingness to bear any unnecessary risk taking. In addition, if this 
were to be extended to the capital markets, it would suggest that investors risk tolerance 
starts to decrease as the SAD season commences. According to Kamstra et al. (2003) this 
is apparent in the capital market as lower returns, especially during fall. Because of this, 
during autumn SAD-influenced investor’s start to reassess their portfolios and invest into 
more secure assets.  
 
Kamstra et al. (2003) remind that the SAD anomaly does not derive from the changes 
that happen to the length of the day between different seasons. Instead, they propose 
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that the SAD is caused by the actual length of the day. Therefore, the anomaly is much 
prominent during fall than in winter. A study conducted by Kelly and Meschke (2010) 
support this hypothesis. In their research, they constructed regression models of SAD 
and stock returns. They find that compared to fall periods, SAD-influenced investors 
mood recovers in winter and as a result, they start to put more weight on stocks. This 
naturally has a positive impact which boosts the stock prices. This is illustrated in figure 
4. Kelly and Meschke (2010) also investigate the monthly returns of different market in-
dices in 1933-2008. They find that during winter the average yield in stocks are much 
higher compared to yield in fall. Their findings support the argument of seasonal pat-




However, Kelly and Meschke (2010) state in their study that investors could, at least in 
theory, take advantage of seasonal anomalies in stock returns. Although this would re-
quire these anomalies to be predictable. Their finding is relevant because it challenges 
the concept of efficient market hypothesis. If the seasonality in stock returns were pre-
dictable, it would offer an exploit to be used to the rational investors for extensive finan-
cial gains. However, they emphasize that not every investor is rational, and it is crucial 
that these anomalies need to be foreseeable.   




While SAD primarily examines how the lack of light and the length of the day affect hu-
man behavior, the research problem can also be turned upside down. Instead, one could 
investigate how the abundance of light affect people. And this is exactly what research-
ers Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) did. They examine the effect of morning sunshine 
on stock returns across 26 different countries. They find that people tend to assess their 
future more optimistically when they are in a good mood.  Furthermore, depending on 
the impact that the environment has on its people, it can have a considerable impact on 
how people evaluate their decisions. According to Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), sun-
shine has a significant effect on investors. They find that during sunny days stock prices 
seemed to hike while on dark and gloomy days stocks seemed to take a dip. Symeonidis, 
Daskalakis and Markellos (2010) backs this argument in their study and find that during 
sunny days when people are more optimistic, they tend to execute long positions, gen-
erating higher returns. 
 
Kaustia and Rantapuska (2016) examine the impact of mood on trading behavior. They 
conducted their research in Finland, where seasonal variations are remarkable. They find 
that during Finnish holiday seasons, such as summer and winter vacations, trading fre-
quency seems to increase. They infer that this is due to families increased need of con-
sumption during said periods. However, it is important to note that compared to the 
international standards, in Finland vacations are moderately long. Although their analy-
sis on Finnish stock market does not give much support for the SAD hypothesis, they do 
find clear seasonal trading indications.  
 
Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) provide another interesting finding. They conducted their 
research by studying the impact of sunny and cloudy weather on trading behavior in five 
major US cities. They find that during cloudy days spreads in New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) tend to widen. They believe that the weather anomaly is more probable in market 
specialists rather than in individual investors. Furthermore, their finding suggest that 
weather conditions have significant impact on liquidity and volatility in the capital 
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markets. However, Loughran and Schultz (2004) believe that it is unlikely that esteemed 
investors would be influenced by factors such as weather. But they do concur that there 
is minor evidence of weather anomaly in NYSE stocks. Furthermore, Levy and Galili’s 
(2008) research support the weather anomaly hypothesis. They find that especially 
young male investors with low income, had a tendency to position themselves as net 
buyers on cloudy days. They argue that this might derive from possible gambling behav-
ior that may occur within this segment.  
 
Symeonidis et al. (2010) believe that the weather affects the market participant’s cogni-
tive behavior. They claim that the changes in stock market volatility could be the cause 
of weather-related shifts and its impact on information that these participants consume. 
Also, they state that while evaluating stocks, social interaction between humans plays a 
pivotal role. Thus, it might be that during warm and sunny weather market participants 
are more likely to interact with each other, increasing the commonly shared information 
and thus volatility. 
 
 
4.2 SAD’s impact on analysts’ recommendations 
Ronald Doeswijk (2008) finds seasonal patterns in analysts’ behavior. His reseach implies 
that during winter season analysts twelve-month forward expected earnings growth rate 
increases while in summer period they decrease. Doeswijk (2008) points out that this 
finding on analysts is in line with the seasonal cycles in the stock market. He suggests 
that this might be because analysts may take into consideration earlier stock price 
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performances into their revisions. Doeswijk (2008) also finds that analysts react slowly 






Dolvin, Pyles and Wu (2009) study the SAD’s impact on analysts’ recommendations. They 
conducted their research by reviewing empirically the analysts forecast errors during 
1998-2004. Their finding suggests that SAD is both statistically and economically signifi-
cant factor in analyst recommendation behavior. They find that in the US forecasts made 
by the analysts during fall and winter months were more pessimistic compared to those 
made during non-SAD months. Their results indicate systematic measurement errors for 
analyst’s one-year ahead forecasts during SAD months. They were less optimistic and 
more pessimistic than the optimistic bias would suggest. However, they reiterate that 
the difference is even more apparent in analysts based in the northern part of the US.   
 
The findings from Dolvin et al. (2009) research signify that SAD has an effective impact 
on analyst’s recommendations and behavior. Their results indicate that analyst located 
in the northern part of the US issue more pessimistic forecasts on average compared to 
Figure 5. Analysts' earnings growth revisions (Ronald Q. Doeswijk, 2008.) 
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those in the southern states. Dolvin et al. (2009) state, that if companies win analysts’ 
estimates by even 1 cent, they are content. However, according to their findings, the SAD 
factors impact around 0.54-1.40 cents to analysts’ estimates. The effect is remarkable. 
Furthermore, this result supports the SAD hypothesis that people are relatively less pes-
simistic in winter than in fall. Nearing the year-end, analysts seem to make more opti-
mistic recommendations compared to autumn.  
 
SAD is known to affect people’s cognition by increasing risk aversion and pessimism. 
When this is extended to analysts, the effect of SAD on analysts would determine their 
willingness to accept excessive risk taking. However, studies have emphasized that be-
cause of the optimistic bias, analysts issue more optimistic recommendations (Brown 
1997; Matsumoto 2002). One argument of SAD’s impact on analysts’ recommendations 
is that it mitigates the effect of the optimistic bias in analysts’ recommendations, making 
them more accurate. (Dolvin, Pyles & Wu, 2009.) 
 
 
4.3 Other seasonal anomalies in the stock market 
As stated previously, the ongoing season affect how a person perceives and utilizes in-
formation. It is thought, that during warm summer days people are more likely to be  
hopeful and optimistic for their future (Hirshleifer & Shumway 2003). Whereas, during 
fall and winter seasons people are more liable to depression and pessimism (Kamstra et 
al., 2003). To make things even more complicated, the stock markets itself has its share 
of seasonal anomalies. Although SAD emphasizes the lack of sunlight’s effect on people, 
it is essential to comprehend stock market anomalies. They are not necessarily the cause 
of SAD or vice versa, but they all affect the market participants. (Jacobsen & Visal-
tanachoti, 2009.) 
 
There are anomalies in stock markets that are more fixated on a specific calendar date 
or month. An example of former would be the Monday effect and the January effect for 
latter. January effect is a stock market anomaly, where the average returns in January far 
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exceed those in the subsequent months. The anomaly is more substantial in small value 
companies compared to large corporations. There has not been unanimous answer for 
the anomaly, but one prominent argument revolves around taxes. Investors gain more 
cash at the end of the year either by bonuses or tax loss selling. The increase in the stock 
prices of small firms can be explained by the increased demand of their stock at the turn 
of the year. (Seyhun, 1988.) 
 
However, Sias and Starks (1997) point out that the window dressing that professional 
investors may exercise has a respectable impact on January effect. Window dressing can 
be defined as a strategy where fund managers or professional investors sell badly fared 
investments from their portfolio and in return buy stock that have performed well. Sias 
and Starks (1997) state that window dressing derives from the pressure that institutional 
investors  confronts. At the end of each year, their proficiency is evaluated by the annual 
performance of their managed portfolio. Thus, they have an incentive to sell bad invest-
ments and buy winners to their portfolio before the annual evaluation on year-end. 
 
Another variation of January effect is the Other January Effect. Marshall and Visal-
tanachoti (2010) define the Other January Effect as an anomaly which suggests that pos-
itive, or negative, returns in January can predict the returns in the subsequent months. 
The theory defines that if a company accumulated positive returns in January, that com-
pany should, on average, yield positive returns during the rest of the year. The Other 
January effect offers an exceptional tool for investors if this argument holds. Marshall 
and Visaltanachoti (2010) reiterate that the Other January Effect should not be used as 
evidence against the efficient market theory since the risk-adjusted excess returns are 
not statistically or economically different from buy-and-hold returns. However, they find 
that the returns from the remaining 11 months after positive January are larger than 
after negative January.  
 
Monday effect is another calendar date anomaly in the capital markets. Many studies 
find that stock returns are negative on average on Mondays (Ariel, 1987; Lakonishok & 
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Smidt, 1988). The Monday effect is not just an anomaly occurring in one specific stock 
market either. Instead, it takes place in other stock markets and between different types 
of securities as well. In addition, the Monday effect appears to be the most eminent in 
the last two weeks of the month. One explanation to the Monday effect is the correlation 
between the returns on Monday and Friday. The returns on last two Mondays of the 
month are positively correlated with Friday, which interestingly is the prior trading day. 
Thus, the returns on Friday can foretell the returns of the next trading day, Monday. 
(Wang, Li & Erickson, 1997.) 
 
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) find that compared to other days of the week, the trad-
ing frequency in NYSE on Monday is much lower. They suggest this is due to the lack of 
institutional investors activity on Monday. Furthermore, they continue that individual 
investors seem to favor sell transaction over buy transactions on Monday. Lakonishok 
and Maberly (1990) believe their finding could help to depict both the Monday and 
weekend effects. Furthermore, Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) find that similar se-
curities performed significantly differently depending on the season. They conducted 
their research by scrutinizing different Treasury bonds and stock indices. They believe 
that market-specific or institutional components cannot by themselves describe season-
ality in the stock market.  
 
Another remarkable seasonal anomaly in the stock market is the Halloween effect. It is 
defined as a stock market anomaly, where stock returns during summer period are su-
perior to those in winter months. Furthermore, the infamous saying “Sell in May and go 
away” is derived from this anomaly. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) conducted their study 
on 37 different countries and discovered that the Sell in May effect is present in 36 of 
those countries. They find five characteristics that make the anomaly stunning. First, the 
anomaly is not solely present in the developed markets, but it also exists in the emerging 
markets as well. Secondly, unlike other anomalies, the Halloween effect has not disap-
peared after its discovery. Thirdly, Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) find the Sell in May strat-
egy outperformed all the other portfolios in most of the sample countries. The fourth 
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finding is that compared to the January or the Monday effect, the Halloween effect can-
not be described plainly by analyzing the data. Furthermore, they argue that the anom-
aly is more like an inherited habit than another calendar anomaly. They conclude by say-
ing that the Halloween effect is not a sector-specific anomaly or a derivation of January 
effect. Instead, they propose that the anomaly has a connection to the timing and the 












5 Data and methodology  
This chapter presents the data and methodology used in this thesis. Furthermore, the 
research hypotheses are introduced in this chapter as well. First, this chapter presents 
the utilized data, which consists of analyst recommendations based in Finland during 
2010–2018. Afterwards, the main hypotheses and methodology are presented at the 
end of this chapter.  
 
 
5.1 Data description 
This thesis employs data which is collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate Sys-
tem (later I/B/E/S) Forecast database. The data consist of analysts’ stock recommenda-
tions and stock prices from the Finnish stock exchange (OMXH) from 01/2010 to 12/2018. 
A stock and its recommendations are included only if the corresponding company has 
received recommendations for the whole observation period. Thus, corporations that 
have been removed/moved off from the OMXH or have not gotten any recommenda-
tions during the observed period or if they have been sold, have been excluded. After 
conducting this screening, 55 companies met these requirements. The list of observed 
companies can be found at the appendix section at the end of this thesis. Overall, there 
were 64422 stock recommendations issued within this period.   
 
The database also provides information regarding analysts forecast estimates. As a mat-
ter of fact, most papers on SAD studies such as Kamstra et al (2003), Dolvin, Pyles and 
Wu (2009) and Lo and Wu (2018) concentrate on analysts’ forecast estimates and fore-
cast revisions. However, the focus on this thesis is on stock recommendations and their 
distribution within the fiscal year. Furthermore, the thesis examines whether there re-
mains a connection between the distribution of analysts’ stock recommendations and 
the future profitability of their recommendations. According to Barber et al. (2006), a 
relation should exist as long as: (1) recommendations issued by the analysts have invest-
ment value, (2) the implicit information in analysts’ recommendations is not immediately 
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The stock recommendations are presented as a percentage unit during a specific period. 
Moreover, they are calculated at the end of a month from the number of total recom-
mendations for a specific stock, for example a buy recommendations proportion is de-
rived from the equation: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝐶 𝐵𝑈𝑌 % =
𝑁𝑂.𝑂𝐹 𝑅𝐸𝐶 𝐵𝑈𝑌
𝑁𝑂.𝑂𝐹 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 




REC BUY % is the percentage proportion of buy recommendations 
from the total recommendations issued for a company at 
the end of a specific month 
 
NO. OF REC BUY is the number of buy recommendations issued for a com-
pany at the end of a specific month 
 
 
NO. OF  
RECOMMENDATIONS is the total number of recommendations issued for a com-
pany at the end of a specific month 
 
 
The same application is extended to calculate the percentage proportion of strong buy, 





The main premise of interest in this thesis is to examine how the recommendations, is-
sued by Finnish analysts, have changed between seasons. This is done by documenting 
the distributions of analysts’ recommendations within 2010–2018, to see whether there 
have been any significant trends. To test the statistical significance, an ordinary least 
squares (later OLS) regression is run, where the announcement day market adjusted re-
turn (ANNR) is compared to the control variables, such as firm-specific controls and SAD 
variables. Later on, the stocks will be distributed into three subsamples depending on 
the recommendation type and whether the firm has received an upgrade, downgrade, 
or resumption. This allows to scrutinize whether recommendation distributions can pre-
dict profitability. And furthermore, it is interesting to see whether SAD variables have 
significance to the excess returns of the surveyed stocks. (Barber et al. 2006.) 
 
Thus, the first regression hypothesis is:  
 
H1: SAD does affect the ANNRs of the surveyed stocks, which have received a recom-
mendation from Finnish analysts 
 
Furthermore, as analysts are associated with the optimism bias, the SAD should make 
them less optimistic during SAD months (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). This should affect 
also to the companies ANNRs and thus the second hypothesis is:  
 
H2: Downgrades during SAD months have a negative effect to the surveyed stocks ANNRs 
 
Kamstra et al. (2003) state that the change in daylight is more notable during fall than in 
winter. To examine this, the third hypothesis intends to find out whether the change in 
ANNRs are more effective during fall than in winter months. 
 
H3: The impact of SAD is more negative to the surveyed stocks ANNRs during fall period 
than in winter period 
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5.3 Methodology  
In this section the study presents the principal methodologies which are used to empir-
ically scrutinize the data. To determine whether the analysts’ recommendations have an 
impact to the stock prices, the stock returns are used as the dependent variable. The 
monthly stock returns are obtained from monthly stock prices which are gathered from 
I/B/E/S database. To obtain the monthly stock returns, the logarithmic difference is em-
ployed to calculate the monthly stock returns: 
 
 
(6)                                   𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡) − ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)            
 
where, 
𝑅𝑖𝑡    is the monthly stock return 
ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡)  is the natural logarithmic of a stock’s price at the end of the 
month 
ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)  is the natural logarithmic of a stock’s price at the end of the t-
1 month 
 
5.3.1 Calculating the Seasonal Affective Disorder  
Kamstra et al. (2003) examine the seasonal patterns in the stock markets. They con-
structed a measure for SAD based on normalized hours of night. This value, Ht , can be 
acquired by using standard approximations from spherical trigonometry. Thus, to derive 
a value for hour of night at latitude δ Kamstra et al. (2003) employ the sun’s declination 
angle, λt , to the equation: 
 
(7)            λ𝑡 = 0,4102 ∗ sin [(
2𝜋
365
) (𝑗𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 − 80,25)] 
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where 𝑗𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡  is represented as the number of the day in the year and is defined as a 
variable that ranges from 1 to 365. On 1st of January its value is 1, and on 2nd of January 
2, and so on. From this assumption we can acquire the number of hours of night Ht  as: 
 





where arccos is defined as the arc cosine. Moreover, according to Kamstra et al. (2003) 
the value for latitude 𝛿 for Helsinki is 60,19.  
 
Finally, after acquiring 𝐻𝑡 Kamstra et al. (2003) construct SAD measure 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 as follow-
ing: 
 
(9)            𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =   {
𝐻𝑡 − 12 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
0                                                                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
Furthermore, this thesis aims to study the seasonal variations within the SAD period. Lin 
(2015) did exactly this by constructing two dummy variables. 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡 variable is equal to 
one if the recommendation is announced in the fall period and 0 otherwise, while 
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 is equal to one if the recommendation has been announced in the winter and 
0 otherwise.  
 
5.3.2 OLS regression 
After calculating 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡, an OLS regression is employed. This thesis utilizes a similar re-
search approach as Barber et al. (2006), where they examine the investment banks’ stock 
recommendation distributions in the US. However, the notable differences here besides 
the data sample is that this thesis examines the SAD and its effect to the announcement 
day market-adjusted returns. The OLS formula is as follows: 
 
(10)      𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 +    
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 𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑖  is the announcement day market-adjusted return of stock i (the stock’s an-
nouncement day return minus the return of OMXHCAP value-weighted market index). 
As stated previously, 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 gains a different value depending on the day of the year i.e. 
on the day of the announcement. Several control variables are included to the OLS re-
gression to control cross-sectional differences. After the SAD variable, firm-specific con-
trol variables are introduced. Most notably the size, which is measured by the company’s 
market-to-book, and volatility, beta, are included to the model. Size is an important var-
iable and known to affect analysts’ recommendations (Dolvin et al., 2009). After firm-
specific controls, analyst-specific control variables are included to the model. Most no-
tably the consensus recommendation rating and the total outstanding recommenda-
tions for the company are added. Barber at al. (2001) state that it is important to control 
consensus rating, since it can influence the way investors react to analyst recommenda-
tions. Better overall rating, the more moderately investors react to negative information 
about the company and so forth. Furthermore, Barber et al. (2006) use total outstanding 
recommendations in their model to examine how the amount of issued analyst recom-
mendations affect the market-adjusted returns. The more recommendations a company 
has received, the more endorsed the company is (Barber et al. 2006).  
 
𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 is the stock’s market to book ratio the day before the recommendation, 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 is 
individual company’s beta, 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the analysts’ consensus recommendation for 
the stock i during time t (it can have value from 1 to 5 depending on the consensus rec-
ommendation, where 1 = strong buy and 5 = strong sell), 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the number of 
outstanding recommendation for stock i at time t. The last two control variables, 
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡, are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the stock has 
received an upgrade or downgrade at time t and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, regressions 
using only one of these dummy variables with other control variables are constructed 
depending on the portfolio i.e. if the stock has received an upgrade to the buy recom-
mendation, the upgrade dummy variable takes the value of one. Afterwards, the recom-
mendations are pooled into three subsamples: (1) upgrades to strong buy or buy, (2) 
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downgrades to either hold, sell or strong sell, (3) resumptions of coverage i.e. when the 
company has not received an upgrade nor a downgrade. Thus, three separate regression 
models are run depending on the subsample. Below is an example of subsample (1):  
 
(11)    𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  
 
For subsamples (2) and (3), the regression model is modified so that the 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 con-
trol variable is changed to 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡  or 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  respectively. 
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable just like 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡, gaining the 
value of 1 if the company has not received an upgrade nor a downgrade at time t and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Finally, this thesis intends to examine the seasonal differences in subsamples within the 
SAD period. To achieve this, two dummy variables are added into the equation 11. This 
is done by following Lin’s (2015) example. Below is the regression model for the upgrade 
subsample. 
 
(12)    𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡 ∗  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  
 
Again, for subsamples (2) and (3), the regression model is otherwise identical to equation 





6 Empirical research  
This chapter presents the results of the empirical research. The main interest is to see 
whether there are any seasonal patterns in analyst’s recommendation behavior in Fin-
land. Then an OLS regression, which was presented in last chapter, will be run to analyze 
the statistical significance of the hypotheses.  
 
Table 1 presents data on Finnish analysts’ stock recommendations and distributions be-
tween strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell recommendations from 2010–2018. The 
values represent the end of the year value i.e. at the end of 2010, “buy” recommenda-






Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the distribution of analysts’ recommendations 
Year Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell Total 
2010 926 3002 1981 2146 281 8356 
2011 894 3199 2296 2052 342 8783 
2012 1002 2654 2409 1803 276 8144 
2013 743 2143 2349 1838 463 7535 
2014 754 1981 1881 1541 484 6641 
2015 956 1927 1806 1387 342 6417 
2016 913 2013 1741 1516 303 6486 
2017 632 1903 2158 1218 334 6245 
2018 839 1866 1865 997 248 5815 
Total 7658 20708 18487 14498 3071 64422 
Total (%) 11,89 % 32,14 % 28,70 % 22,50 % 4,77 % 100 % 
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Buy ratings have been by far the most prominent recommendation rating within analysts 
based in Finland. Figure 8 illustrates both the evolution of analysts’ recommendations 
distribution and evolution of the Finnish equity market OMXH during 2010–2018. Later 
in the regressions, OMXHCAP which is the value-weighted index, is used as the reference 
index. The main reason being that in a value-weighted index, such as in OMXHCAP, a firm 
cannot have a weight over ten percent to the market, thus mitigating possible correlation 
biases. Furthermore, dividends are also included in the OMXHCAP, and in literature the 
use of value-weighted indices are more common.  
 
In figure 8 both “BUY” and “SELL” lines include also strong buy and strong sell recom-
mendations. The proportions (%) of recommendations are on the left-hand side and the 
OMXH on the right-hand side. The figure indicates that the Finnish analysts have had an 
optimistic expectation for the future, hence such a strong consensus towards buy rec-
ommendations. Within nine years only for three months (10/2013–11/2013 and 
01/2014) has buy recommendation not been the most issued recommendation. It has 
risen from 40 % to over 50 % by the end of 2018. On the other hand, after 2010, sell 
recommendations have been the least issued recommendation type. While both buy 
recommendations and the OMXH has increased during 2010–2018 period, sell recom-
mendations have decreased from almost 40 % to below 20 %. Interestingly both sell and 
hold recommendations follow an eerily similar distribution path. Another interesting 
finding is that the total amount of issued recommendations have steadily decreased 






Table 2 illustrates the recommendation distributions during SAD and non-SAD months. 
As can be seen, regardless of the recommendation type or year, recommendations is-
sued by Finnish analysts during SAD months exceed those that are issued during non-
SAD season i.e. non fall or winter periods. The largest gap between these two seasons is 
in buy recommendations (3272 recommendations) and smallest in strong sell (620). Be-
sides sell recommendations, the other recommendations have not experienced such 
fluctuations during SAD months. However, sell recommendations have more than halved 
from 1287 to 555 recommendations. Similar finding is apparent in non-SAD months as 
well, where sell recommendations have decreased from 860 to 442 recommendations. 
Overall, as seen previously in table 1, the total amount of recommendations has steadily 
decreased from 2010 to 2018. Another notable trend is that Finnish analysts tend to 




















































































































































































BUY HOLD SELL OMXH (RHS)
Figure 6. The distribution of analysts’ stock recommendations in Finland during 
01/2010–12/2018 
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Table 2. The distribution of analysts’ recommendations during SAD seasons  
 
Year Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell Total 
2010 512 1774 1111 1287 169 4854 
2011 509 1836 1360 1180 191 5075 
2012 553 1553 1456 1082 181 4826 
2013 413 1197 1430 1076 295 4410 
2014 460 1159 1108 894 267 3888 
2015 552 1144 1073 796 200 3766 
2016 515 1133 1041 892 203 3784 
2017 366 1110 1210 751 189 3626 
2018 501 1084 1083 555 151 3374 
Total 4380 11990 10874 8514 1846 37603 
 
Recommendation distribution during non-SAD months 
Year Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell Total 
2010 414 1247 869 860 111 3502 
2011 386 1363 937 871 151 3708 
2012 449 1101 953 721 95 3318 
2013 329 946 919 762 168 3125 
2014 294 822 773 647 217 2753 
2015 403 783 733 591 142 2651 
2016 398 880 700 625 100 2702 
2017 266 793 948 467 145 2619 
2018 339 782 782 442 97 2441 
Total 3279 8718 7613 5984 1226 26819 
 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics regarding analysts’ stock recommendation up-
grades and downgrades. The “Upgrade” and “Downgrade” columns display the total up-
grades to either sell, hold, buy or strong buy recommendations and total downgrades to 
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buy, hold, sell or strong sell at the end of that specific year. The columns “SAD” and “Non-
SAD” represents the value of upgrades and downgrades respectively during each SAD 
and non-SAD month.  Interestingly, it seems that Finnish analysts tend to issue both up-
grades and downgrades more frequently during SAD months than on non-SAD months. 
Overall, from 2010 to 2018, Finnish analysts issued over 1500 upgrades during SAD 
months while almost 1400 upgrades during non-SAD months. More apparent difference 
can be seen on downgrades. The difference between SAD and non-SAD downgrades are 
almost 600 downgrades. The findings suggest that during SAD months, analysts are more 
pessimistic and issue more downgrades to either buy, hold, sell, or strong sell. Further-
more, while OMXH rose from 6000 to over 10000 points during this time frame, it is 
interesting to witness more downgrades than upgrades. However, most of those down-
grades have been issued during 2011–2013, which incidentally is during the European 
debt crisis.  
 
 
Table 3. The distribution of analysts’ upgrades and downgrades during non-SAD and SAD seasons 
Year Upgrade SAD Non-SAD Downgrade SAD Non-SAD 
2010 365 163 202 364 217 147 
2011 442 226 216 435 267 168 
2012 368 155 213 426 265 161 
2013 322 161 161 427 289 138 
2014 349 203 146 255 141 114 
2015 286 131 155 307 218 89 
2016 238 152 86 283 157 126 
2017 248 152 96 238 142 96 
2018 284 165 119 192 112 80 





6.1 Regression analysis 
This chapter presents the results of the OLS regression analysis. The regression analysis 
measures whether the announcement day market-adjusted returns, and the control var-
iables that were introduced in the previous chapter, are statistically significant. The aim 
is to investigate whether seasonality play any role in the stock returns and, is this an 
occurrence that investors should be concerned with.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of the first OLS regression where the dependent variable in 
each seven (7) regressions is the recommendation announcement day market-adjusted 
return for stock i. Almost every control variable besides beta and total recommendations 
are statistically significant, and in most cases at the 1 % significance level. Most notably 
the statistical significance of SAD variable increases as more controls are added. The in-
tercept term, or alpha, interestingly changes depending on the model. First it is negative, 
while only firm specific controls are included into the regression model, such as MB and 
beta. However, as analyst specific variables, like consensus recommendations and total 
outstanding recommendations, are added, the intercept becomes positive. RecCons co-
efficient term is naturally negative since higher value indicates worse rating. Further-
more, the coefficient on upgrade is positive, meaning if the stock has received an up-
grade, it yields a positive reaction to the ANNR. The coefficient on the downgrade varia-
ble is negative, which implies that if the company has received a downgrade, it affects 
negatively to the ANNR’s. These findings are quite logical. The coefficient in the SAD is 
positive, and it is statistically significant at 1 % level in every model besides in model (7), 
where it is 5 % significant. This would imply that after the winter solstice, when the du-
ration of daylight increases, both analysts and investors alike, who are suffering from the 
SAD, begin to recuperate, which leads to higher ANNRs during the SAD season. The re-
sults in table 4 suggest that SAD affects the ANNRs of the surveyed companies and thus 






Table 4. The results of the OLS regression. 
The ANNR is the dependent variable and the independent/control variables are visible on the first col-
umn. The t-values are shown in the square brackets.  





































































RECDOWN       -0,0103 
[-4,52]*** 
R-Square 0,0369 0,0809 0,0819 0,1154 0,1156 0,1159 0,1401 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 % level 
 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the three subsamples: (1) upgrades to strong buy 
and buy, (2) downgrades to hold, sell or strong sell, and (3) resumption with a strong buy, 
buy, hold, sell, or strong sell. The results of the first two subsamples are illustrated in 
table 5 while the third in table 6. Again, the SAD variable is statistically significant in every 
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model, and the same conclusion from the previous regression results can be derived 
here in upgrades and downgrades as well. As SAD sufferers start to recover from the 
year-end, it has a positive effect and in turn ANNRs start to go up. These findings also 
support the second hypothesis since the downgrade variable is statistically significant in 
all three models and the coefficients are all negative. The results are somewhat in line 
with the first regression as well; MB is statistically significant, and the coefficient is pos-
itive. Thus, companies that have high MB ratio tends to have higher ANNRs. However, 
the beta variable becomes statistically significant at 10 % level in models 4 and 5. The 
coefficient is positive, therefore surveyed companies with higher beta yielded more 
ANNR. Interestingly, in the models 2 and 5, the total recommendation variable is statis-
tically significant at 10 % level.  The coefficient is negative in the model 2, which suggests 
that as the number of analysts buy recommendations increases, the less ANNR that com-
pany accumulates. The opposite is true in model 5, which captures the ANNRs in down-
grades to strong sell. This would imply that the more recommendations a company, that 
has received a downgrade to strong sell, has, the more ANNR is earned. One thing to 
bear in mind is, that even though a company might have received a downgrade from one 
analyst, others might have resumed their coverage. Thus, the more recommendations 
that individual company has, the more likely it is that specific company might have either 















Table 6 reports regression results from subsample (3), where the condition was that a 
company has not received either an upgrade or a downgrade at time t. Again, the results 
Table 5. Regression results of subsample (1) and (2) 
This table reports the regression results of ANNR on seasonal affective disorder, mar-
ket to book, consensus recommendation value, recommendations outstanding on the 
stock, upgrades, and downgrades. Regressions (1) and (2) are upgrades to strong buy 
and buy respectively, while (3)-(5) are downgrades to hold, sell and strong sell.  The t-
values are shown in the square brackets. 

































































   






R-Square 0,1015 0,1169 0,1245 0,1229 0,0798 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 % level 
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are in line with the previous regressions. SAD and MB variables are 1 % significant in 
every model. The consensus recommendation variable is 1 % statistically significant in 
models 1 to 3, while 5 % significant in model 4. The resumption variable is statistically 
significant at 5 % level in models 2 (buy) and 3 (hold), and 4 (sell). This indicates that the 
covered firms that have received an initiation from analysts with a buy, hold or sell, have 
generated positive ANNR during 2010–2018. The coefficient is highest in buy recommen-
dation (model 2) and lowest in sell recommendation type (model 4). This is logical, as 
the more positive rating the more positive response from the investors.   
 
Table 6. Regression results of subsample (3)  
Regression (1) stands for strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell, and (5) strong sell. The 
t-values are shown in the square brackets. 







































































R-Square 0,1023 0,1185 0,1180 0,1126 0,0736 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 % level 
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Table 7 reports regression results where SAD variable has been split into two dummies: 
fall and winter dummy variables. They take the value of one depending on the SAD sea-
son: if the season is fall, the fall dummy is equal to one and 0 otherwise. And during 
winter period, the winter dummy is equal to one and so on.  The variable is then multi-
plied by the value of SAD variable. Table 7 presents regression results from upgrades and 
downgrades in fall and winter periods, thus providing findings for subsamples (1) and (2). 
Models 1 and 2 represents subsample (1) i.e. upgrades to strong buy and buy respec-
tively. Models 3-5 illustrates the results for subsample (2); downgrades to hold, sell and 
strong sell. The results suggest that the SAD effect is statistically most prominent during 
the winter season since the winter dummy is statistically significant in every model be-
sides in model 5 (strong sell). Downgrade variable is statistically significant with negative 
coefficients, which suggests that when a company receives a downgrade it has a dimin-
ishing effect to the company’s announcement day market-adjusted returns. Furthermore, 
it seems that investors response to downgrades are more negative during fall than in 
winter, hence the Fall coefficient being mostly negative and lower than the Winter coef-
ficient. Fall variable is only positive in model 1 (strong buy), which is the most optimistic 
recommendation type. This is in line with Kamstra et al. (2003), because the sudden de-
crease in daylight during fall season affect more negatively to people than in winter, 
when the amount of daylight starts to ramp up again. This finding supports the third 
hypothesis, reinforcing the assumption that the SAD’s impact is more negative during 
fall. Interestingly, the amount of outstanding recommendations is statistically significant 
at 10 % level only on upgrades to buy (2) and downgrades to strong sell (5) models. The 
coefficient is negative in the former and positive in the latter. This suggests that during 
SAD months, companies that have received a lot of recommendations from Finnish ana-
lysts tend to have smaller ANNRs if they have received an upgrade to buy. The opposite 






Table 7. Regression test on upgrades and downgrades using fall and winter dummies 
Regressions (1) and (2) are upgrades to strong buy and buy respectively, while (3)-(5) 
are downgrades to hold, sell and strong sell. The t-values are shown in the square 
brackets. 











































































   






R-Square 0,0917 0,1130 0,1168 0,1184 0,0748 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level 





The results from table 8 supports the finding that the SAD effect is more prominent dur-
ing winter season. This is apparent even in the resumption subsample (3). Again, the 
Winter variable is statistically significant at 1 % level in every model except in model 5. 
The coefficient in the Fall variable is negative in models 2-5, suggesting that investors 
initial reaction to resumptions are mostly negative during SAD months. However, this 
finding is not statistically significant. Interestingly, the amount of recommendations a 
surveyed company has received does not seem to be statistically significant in subsample 
(3). Furthermore, the market-to-book ratio is statistically significant at 1 % level in every 
model here as well. Beta variable is statistically significant at 5 % level only in models 4 
(sell) and 5 (strong sell). Thus, the individual company’s volatility should be taken into 
consideration even if analysts have resumed their recommendations at sell or strong sell. 
However, while having a positive coefficient, the resumption variable is not statistically 
significant. This is interesting, since in table 6, the resumption variable was statistically 
significant in buy, hold, and sell regressions. This might derive from the fact that both 
Fall and Winter dummies are included into the regressions. Table 9 illustrates the find-
ings when these dummies have been separated into their own regressions. Interestingly, 
now the resumption variable is again statistically significant in models 2-4. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that for the resumption subsample, the fall season is much more sta-
tistically significant period, because the resumption variable has higher t-values in the 












Table 8. Regression results on resumptions using fall and winter dummies 
Regression (1) stands for strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell, and (5) strong sell. The 
t-values are shown in the square brackets. 

















































































R-Square 0,0921 0,1128 0,1109 0,1093 0,0688 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level 






Table 9. Regression test results on resumptions using fall dummy 
Regression (1) stands for strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell, and (5) strong sell. The 
t-values are shown in the square brackets. 







































































R-Square 0,0832 0,0901 0,0918 0,0850 0,0660 
Regression results on resumptions using winter dummy 
Regression (1) stands for strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell, and (5) strong sell. The 
t-values are shown in the square brackets. 



































Overall, the empirical research gives evidence that SAD has statistical significance to the 
surveyed companies market-adjusted returns by increasing the company’s announce-
ment day market adjusted returns as we move on from fall period to the winter period. 
Hence, the positive seasonal effect to the ANNRs is more prominent during winter sea-
son than in fall. Thus, the first hypothesis holds, and the results suggest that SAD does 
affect companies’ announcement day market-adjusted returns. As for the second hy-
pothesis, the downgrades are statistically significant in every model. Furthermore, 
downgrades had a diminishing effect to the surveyed companies’ ANNRs. In addition, 
downgrades are statistically significant in subsample (2) i.e. when a surveyed company 
received a downgrade. Thus, the second hypothesis holds true. The third hypothesis also 
holds true, since in every model, the fall coefficient was lower than that of winters. Fur-
thermore, the coefficient for the winter variable was statistically significant in every 
model, while the opposite was true for the fall variable.  
 
Interestingly, while in the overall sample (table 4) the upgrade variable was statistically 
significant, it was not in any model when the subsamples were introduced. The overall 









































R-Square 0,0919 0,1121 0,1107 0,1078 0,0688 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10 % level 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 % level 
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no clear conclusions can be made of the statistical significance of upgrades to the sur-
veyed companies ANNRs.  
 
Nonetheless the regression results provided interesting findings. MB ratio was statisti-
cally significant in every model, implying that the size of the company is positively corre-
lated with the announcement day returns. Beta, on the other hand, was not statistically 
significant until the subsamples were introduced. Thus, the volatility of the company 
should be considered when the company receives either an upgrade, downgrade, or re-
sumption. Furthermore, the alphas in strong buy samples were in every model statisti-
cally significant. Whether the company had received an upgrade or a resumption with a 
strong buy, the surveyed companies generated positive alphas. The consensus analyst 
rating was mostly statistically significant, which roughly means that a company with a 
strong sell consensus rating typically accumulates less ANNR than a company which has 
a strong buy recommendation – which makes sense. Surprisingly, the total recommen-
dations did not play that much importance to the ANNRs. This thesis employed generic 
data from the recommendations issued by the Finnish analysts, where the total out-
standing recommendations for a stock i at a time t was given. Another interesting topic 
for further studies would be to analyze individual analysts’ recommendation behavior 











The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of SAD on Finnish analysts’ recom-
mendations. The study presented important literature and theoretical background about 
analysts and the factors that can affect their recommendations and behavior. Like the 
rest of us, analysts too are human and prone to the same behavioral biases. The most 
prominent bias being the optimistic bias, which affects analyst’s capability to incorporate 
new information. (Ramnath, Rock & Shane 2008.) 
  
The main argument behind SAD hypothesis is that people tend to be more risk averse 
during autumn and winter periods. The lack of sunlight is thought to be the cause of this, 
and it is believed to increase pessimism and depression. In addition, weather and even 
a person’s mood affects how people react to new information. Thus, it is not too far 
‘fetched to state that cold and dark weather will influence negatively on people, making 
them more likely to feel negative emotions. (Kamstra et al. 2003.) 
 
This thesis offers further support to SAD studies, showing that during 2010-2018, SAD 
was both economically and statistically significant in explaining the market-adjusted re-
turns of companies that had received a recommendation from the Finnish analysts. 
More specifically, the SAD effect of the surveyed companies was statistically more signif-
icant during winter period i.e. from December to March. However, the initial response 
to downgrades during fall season was higher than those issued in winter. This is in line 
with previous studies with Kamstra et al. (2003), where they state that the SAD effect is 
more dominant during autumn months.  
 
This thesis employed an OLS regression model, where the announcement day market-
adjusted return was the independent variable. Furthermore, firm specific controls like 
size and volatility with analyst specific control were added to study the impact of SAD to 
the surveyed companies ANNR. SAD was statistically significant at 5 % level when all the 
control variables were included. Furthermore, four subsamples were constructed to 
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study the impact of upgrades, downgrades, and resumptions to the ANNRs. Again, SAD 
was statistically significant in every model.  
 
Another interesting finding was that Finnish analysts tend to issue more recommenda-
tions during SAD months, where the buy recommendation is the most common recom-
mendation. The Finnish stock market has experienced consistent upside trend within the 
surveyed eight-year timeframe. Thus, it is not surprising to see an optimistic recommen-
dation, such as the buy recommendation, as the most common one.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis showed that Finnish analysts issue more downgrades during 
SAD months than upgrades. One could argue this is due to SAD mitigating the optimistic 
bias, by increasing analysts’ risk aversion, and thus prompting them to issue less opti-
mistic recommendations. This is a finding that should be further investigated. Barber et 
al. (2006) study similar phenomenon with the US analysts and stocks. By incorporating 
their model with Finnish analysts’ upgrades and downgrades and constructing portfolios 
depending on the recommendations should yield interesting results. In addition, as sug-
gested earlier, another interesting topic to research is how the behavior of individual 
analysts changes during different seasons. This would allow different controls to be 
added to the regression model, such as the prestige of the analyst and its effect to 
his/her recommendation forecasts.  
 
This thesis provided further support to studies about SAD and its impact on analysts. As 
stated, the results imply that SAD affects Finnish analysts, and the Finnish financial mar-
ket as well. When evaluating stocks or recommendations issued by Finnish analysts, in-
vestors in Finland should consider seasonality. To conclude, the impact that external fac-
tors, such as the weather and the circumstances of analysts' living conditions, have on 
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